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Comes now the Appellant, Michael Landes f by and through his
counsel of iecuni, ami respect tu J J y submits I he In I lowing rep] y to
Respondent's Brief:

STATEMEN

1.

On or about November 15, 1979, Bagel Nosh Intermountain,

Ltd, (Bagel Nosh) applied for a SBA guarantied loan from Respondent
in the amount of $300,000.

Under the terms of that loan, which is

governed by Title 13 of the Code of Fedei: a] Reg til at I ons, the SBA
agreed to participate in the loan and guarantied ninety percent
(90%) of the outstanding obligation
time Bagel Nosh appl i ed for

Respondent.

At the

• -

.-••,.,.

were the majority stockholders of Bagel Nosh.

As part of the loan

transaction, Appellant and the Seftels were required to execute
personal «ju«n ant i eh presented on ,SHA''i I'm1" 14tl HI.J LBfaiitf I MIS*
deeds on condominiums the parties owned In Snowbird, Utah, as
security for the guaranties.

2. On December 24, 1979, the SBA guarantied loan was approved
and a loan agreement and promissory note executed by Bagel Nosh in
favor" of Respondent.,

~

K „ 1 0 5 - I (J 6

. -:

The proceeds of the loan were used by Bagel Nosh for the
i equipping of a Bagel Nosh restaurant in Park City,

ACS/ms
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Utah.

4. Under the terms of the Form 148 guaranties, Appellant and
the Seftels agreed to guaranty payment of the total loan amount to
the SBA and Respondent as joint obligees.

R. 129, 133.

As

additional collateral for the loan, Bagel Nosh granted Respondent
a security interest in all its equipment and assets.

5.

Following disbursement of the loan proceeds, Bagel Nosh

constructed

its

restaurant

facilities

and

began

operations.

Appellant is not a resident of the State of Utah and did not have
any

responsibility

restaurant.

As

for
with

the

management

many

start

up

or

operation

companies,

of

Bagel

the
Nosh

experienced its share of problems and eventually went into default
on its payments to Respondent.

6.

Bagel Nosh's initial default on the obligation led to the

restructuring

of

the

agreement

between

the

parties.

The

restructuring was reduced to wiriting in a document entitled Loan
Restructure Agreement, dated March 30, 1983.

R. 137.

That

agreement provided among other things for modification of the
original loan and guaranty agreements.
restructuring,

no

new

personal

Appellant and the Seftels.

In conjunction with this

guaranties

were

executed

by

If given the opportunity at trial,

Appellant will prove that any guarantied liability was extinguished
at that time.
ACS/ms
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7.

After

experiencing

continued

financial

problems,

on

November 8, 1 9134, Bagel Nosh fi led a peti tion for relief under
Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code. R. 187

As a

debtor-in-possession, Bagel Nosh continued for a period of ti me to
make payments to Respondent pursuant to the terms of the Loan
Restructure Agreement.

8. In an effort to protect their interests, Appellant and the
Seftels

initiated

the

present

actio)

determine the exi stence and extent, i : •
guarantors

of

the

Bagel

Nosh

against

Respondent

to

• :::: £ thei r ] iabi 1 ity as

obligation.

In

response

to

Plaintiff's complaint, Respondent filed a counterclaim under which

9
] 4Hb,

Following limited discovery by Appellant, on July 25,
Heiipniiidc'iit ii Lrdl i l s Motion

toi Summary

udgment against

Appellant and the Seftels.

]0
Appellant

I:i i r e s p o n s e to Respondent s M o t i o n for Summary Judgment,
filed

a Rep] y M e m o r a n d u m

i n which

it asserted

that

R e s p o n d e n t h a d failed t o join t h e SBA, a n i n d i s p e n s a b l e party, in
i ts a t t e m p t e d enforcement of t h e original g u a r a n t y a g r e e m e n t s . R
208-222.

F e b r u a r y 4, 1987, Third Judicial District Court Judge
ACS/ms
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Timothy R. Hanson issued a Memorandum Decision granting Summary
Judgment in favor of Respondent on all issues. R. 308-313. On the
issue

of

the

joinder

of

the

SBA,

Judge

Hanson

explained:

"Plaintiffs have further alleged that an indispensable party, the
Small Business Administration, has not been joined.
is without merit.
pled,

but

That defense

In the first instance, the defense has not been

additionally,

the

SBA

is

not

under

the

present

interpretation of the Rules of Procedure an indispensable party to
this action."

12.

R. 311.

When the indispensable party issue was addressed on

Appeal, the Court of Appeals, in its opinion,

recognized that the

SBA was a ninety percent (90%) participating lender and that the
guaranties which formed the basis of Appellant's alleged liability
were executed on SBA forms in favor of both the SBA and Respondent
as "co-lenders."

Seftel v. Capital City Bank, 767 P.2d 941, 943

(Utah App. 1989).

13.

Following entry of the district court's partial final

judgment and decree of foreclosure, on June 4, 1987, Appellant and
the Seftels filed a Notice of Appeal and posted a supersedeas bond
in the total amount of the judgment, plus interest.

14. While the present Appeal was before the Court of Appeals,
on March 17, 1988, the Seftels filed for relief under Chapter 7 of
the United States Bankruptcy Code in the United States Bankruptcy
ACS/ms

5

Court for the District of Utah

rent raJ I) i v i K I on

O n November J 7,

1986, t h e B a g e l N o s h b a n k r u p t c y w a s c o n v e r t e d to a liquidation
proceeding under Chapter
1987,

r the Bankruptcy Code,

an order was eritt L-

t

O n A p r i l 15,

ne Urn I ec;l St dt.es bankruptcy Judge

closing the estate of Bagel Nosh,

l)n Octobej 6l( 19 813, which wait iiiorf than a yeai aftei I he
judgment was entered i n the present case, Respondent allegedlyreceived from the SBA an assignment of all of its right, title and
in terest i i :t tl le guarai it;j agreements .

(Af £i dav i 1: of Stan Nakano,

attached to Respondent's Memorandum in Support of its Motion as
Exhibit

"A").

This

alleged

assignment

was

effected

by

the

endorsement of the guaranty agreements by Stan Nakano, acting as
the

District

Director

of

the

SBA

in

the

District

of

Utah.

(Affidavit of M. A. Allem, attached to Respondent's Memorandum as
Exhibit

"B").

Pri or to thi« alleged assignment

of the SBA's

interest, Respondent had advanced the position that the SBA had no
interest I n the obJ :I gati on evidenced by the g uaranty agreement and
had no direct claim or cause of action against the Appellant.
(Respondent's
Certiorar I , p

18,
decision

Brief in Opposition to the Petition for Writ of
9 • ] 0).

On January

1989, the Court of Appeals issued its

In its r: , .: . •

je Court

of Appeals held that, the

district court committed error in its analysis of the joinder of
the SBA but concluded that the fact the SBA had given Respondent
ACS/ms
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written authorization to enforce the obligation rendered the error
harmless.

17. The condominium pledged by the Seftels as collateral for
their guaranty was subject to a first mortgage loan from Crossland
Savings. Following the filing of the Seftels' bankruptcy petition,
Crossland issued notice of a foreclosure sale of the property
scheduled for February 23, 1989. Prior to the Seftels' bankruptcy,
Appellant
Seftel's

had been granted a third mortgage
condominium

to

secure

the

interest

in the

Seftels' portion

of the

supersedeas bond. On February 10, 1989, Respondent filed a motion
in the United
foreclosure.

States Bankruptcy Court to stop the scheduled
On February 21, 1989, the Bankruptcy Court denied

Respondent's motion.

18.

Following

the

denial

of

its motion

to

stop

the

foreclosure sale, on February 22, 1989, Respondent and the SBA
entered into an agreement whereby the SBA purchased the first
mortgage interest, substituted itself as trustee, and proceeded
with the foreclosure sale. (Answer of Capital City Bank in Michael
Landes v. Capital City Bank, et al., Civil No. 89-0902926, in the
Third District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah).
to

the

purchase

of

the

Crossland

Mortgage,

Appellant

Prior
gave

Respondent and the SBA notice of an agreement between Respondent
and Crossland whereby Appellant agreed to cure the default and
reinstate the mortgage.
ACS/ms
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19.

un L

aorning ml fVbiuat'y

a m o t i o n for t

ssuanc<

I "III1!, A|i(*'ll<ii 1 hi rniqht

-M,

t e m p o r a r y r e s t r a i n i n g o r d e r o n for

hearing before the Honorable Timothy

lanson.

At that

hearing,

t h e S B A c o n t e s t e d t h e m o I inn by
i> w

•

a p a r t y JII the a c t i o n and t h e r e f o r e n o t subject to the

Court

s j u r i s d i c t i o n o r t h e s t a y imposed b y t he s u p e r s e d e a s

W"l

' -

m-ui

I

I »:*i I

ni i

II! I n

II i fiii)

bond

I I , | I |»* i l i M { j i

i

f

c o u n s e l for t h e S B A e x p l a i n e d t o t h e C o u r t t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n
the SBA and Respondent

Respondent

and stated

receive

Respondent

collects

n vt\

unde?

*c

that t h e S B A h a d ~

percent

ontinuing

(90%

judgment

monies

Transcript

of

a a t e d February
p

3 1 ) .

.

Hearing

23j -1 989,

• ....-

let

count's denial

Appellant's

motion for a temporary restraining order on February 23, 1989, the
SBA

proceeded
dominium

with

the

Respondent.

foreclosm
The

•

SnttPl'f.
- .

property

eliminated Appellant's junior lien position in that property.

.Ml

mi 11in Mdy "'"i" i I'JH'h A p p e l l a n t

filed a s e p a r a t e

proceeding

a g a i n s t R e s p o n d e n t a n d t h e S B A In t h e T h i r d J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t C o u r t
o f S a l t L a k e C o u n t y , Sta
that actionf
ACS/ms

Appellant

s e e k s d a m a g e s i n c u r r e d a s a result

8

t

-

foreclosure sale of the Seftels' condominium.

In its answer to

Appellant's complaint, Respondent admitted that it entered into an
agreement with the SBA on or b€jfore February 22, 1989, whereby the
SBA purchased the Crossland Note and the Seftel-Crossland Trust
Deed.

(Answer of Capital City Bank, in Civil No. 89-0902926)

(Certified copies of the complaint and answer in Civil No. 890902926

are

attached

hereto

as

Exhibit

"B").

Therefore,

notwithstanding its alleged prior assignment of all its right,
title and interest in the guaranty agreements, the SBA continues
to be actively involved with Respondent in all actions relative to
the obligation in question.

22. Appellant filed his petition for Writ of Certiorari with
this Court on March 2, 1989. Appellant's petition was granted by
the Court on June 12, 1989 and on August 7, 1989, the Brief of
Appellants was filed.

On October 10, 1989, Respondent filed its

Brief in this matter.

FIRST ARGUMENT
THE PRESENT APPEAL, HAS NOT BEEN RENDERED
MOOT BY THE ALLEGED ASSIGNMENT

Respondent argues the alleged post-judgment assignment somehow
renders the present appeal moot. Because the SBA remains the real
party

in

interest

participation

ACS/ms

in relation

interest,

the

to

its

assignment

9

ninety
has

not

percent
changed

(90%)
the

c i renins L a i K ' e s rind I, r1 -> in i »l e l m i incited t llh v i "cim 1 rove ir sy p* esenie Il M "
this appeal

Ii a d d i t i o n , the a s s i g n m e n t h a s n o t r e n d e r e d t h e

relief request impossible or of no legal affect.

Respondent argues that if this Court were li» determine that
the SBA should have been joined, then joinder would be meaningless
because o

assignment

•- interest of the SBA

Respondent

misconceives the impact of this alleged assignment.

*
that
A

, •+ >t assignment is the concept

undamental premise ot

assignee takes nothing more

.; .

.

C

-..

1980

w

. •

t
y-

wj

**.A->_C-

•»

. the a s s i g n m e n t

assignee

« J W

4

w

assignment than his

. r

A i t u t j .

i
»-

w_»

"lli il
1

^ interest

1

1

*I> If
M

:
jp

I

Il Il I , ail ,

ItQ
I

I

II

ontract gives the

same rights as the assignor under the contract and
J ack G. Parson Companies v

Nield,

1,

1133 (Utah 1985); First Inv. Co. v. Andersen, 62 1 P.2d 683, 686
(Utah 1980)

A nd, wii i ] e t h e a s s i g n e e b e c o m e s t h e real p a r t y

i in i e r e s t 1111 I u w i n .j a u a ] i c:i somp] ete as si * .
t h e r i g h t to all set offs and d e f e n s e s that h e m a y h a v e o r m a y
acquire

against

asslijiiinr'i i

the

assignor

prior

notification

• :i)f

I: .he

See Time Finance Corporation v. Johnson Trucking Co.,

458 P.2d 873, 876 (Utah 1969); Lvnch v. MacDonald, 367 P.2d 464 f
468 (Utah 1962).

Appellant has maintained that the SBA has an unsecured claim
against him and seeks an opportunity to litigate that claim and
ACS/ms
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present his defenses to the claim.

The fact that the Respondent

may hold the SBA's claim does not eliminate the nature of that
unsecured claim nor the Appellant's legal right to present any and
all defenses to it in a judicial proceeding.

Therefore, the alleged assignment of the SBA's claim against
Appellant, even if valid, does not moot the case because the relief
requested, to witf reversal and remand to the district court for
adjudication of the SBA's unsecured claim, will aff€*ct the rights
of the litigants and the requested relief is not impossible and
will have clear legal effect.
SECOND ARGUMENT
THE PRIOR JUDGMENT IS VOID AND THEREFOR A NULLITY
This Court, and a majority of other courts have held that the
mandatory

joinder of

a necessary party under Rale

jurisdictional in nature.

19(a) is

See Hiltsley v. Ryder, 738 P.2d 1024

(Utah 1987). The jurisdictional nature of the joinder requirements
of Rule 19 have led courts to hold that an order entered without
jurisdiction over a necessary party is null and void.

See

e.g.,

In re Adoption of Ledbetter, 465 N.E. 2d 962, 964 (111. App. 4
Dist. 1984).

Respondent does not challenge or contest this basic rule of
law.

Rather, it simply ignores the jurisdictional nature of Rule

19 and argues that the void judgment should be validated by this
ACS/ms
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Court because of the allegedly post-judgment assignment.

ii L.ne Liiai court did not have jurisdict
a

decision,

post-judgment

assignment

cannot

*r. incur*

jurisdictional defect any more than valid service upon a Defendant
after a judgment was IMIU»M*(1 W M I I M

M-MHIHI

ii |IIIIH, vnnl

||!ii;it)iiN nl

valid and enforceable.
THIRD ARGUMENT
DUE PROCESS REQUIRES THAT APPELLANT HAVE AN
OPPORTUNITY TO DEFEND DIRECTLY AGAINST
THE SBA'S CLAIMS

A basic precept

r

t V* law surrounding mandatory joinder and
L endant has the i: i gh I: to

assen

d

interest.

defenses

he might

have against

the real

party

See Shaw v. Jeppson, 239 P.2d 745, 748 (Utah 1952).

faii[n)j<ji f nl

in I

courts

ruled

have

xn

I mi iiii i if m n n t n e s " ! , R e s p o n d e n t a r g u e s t h a t b o t h

that

Appellant

has

no

defenses

under

lower

the

absolute, unconditional guaranty.

Trt relation to Capital 's claim to repayment
(10%) of

the outstanding

oil ret I

However

obligation

*

>ercent

i\ iiii: dssf ^

-. r the district court nor the Court of

Appeals has litigated that or any other issue in relation to the

ACS/ms
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SBA's claim for repayment of ninety percent of the obligation.1

Rule 19 requires that the Appellant be given the opportunity
to adjudicate any and all defenses that he might have to the SBA's
claim.

At this point in the proceedings he has not been afforded

that opportunity.
defenses

It is not this Court's place to determine what

the Appellant

has to the SBA's claim.

That issue

encompasses questions of fact and law that were not before the
district court and are not the subject of this Appeal.

Fundamental due process of law requires a defendant be given
a fair opportunity to present any and all defenses that he might

x

While Respondent does not expressly argue the issue, the
basis of this part of its mootness claim is that somehow Appellant
is precluded from litigating its defenses against the SBA. Because
the claims of the SBA and Respondent are different, the only legal
basis for such preclusion would be collateral estoppel. This Court
and the Utah Court of Appeals have previously recognized that
application of the doctrine of claim preclusion requires the
existence of the following four factors; (1) the issue decided in
the prior adjudication was identical to the one presented in the
new action; (2) there was a final judgment on the mcsrits; (3) the
party against whom the plea is asserted was a party or in privity
with a party in the prior adjudication; and (4) the issue in the
first case was competently, fully, and fairly litigated.
See
Searle Bros, v. Searle, 588 P.2d 689, 691 (Utah 1978); Schaer v.
State By & Through Utah Dept. , 657 P.2d 1337, 1341 (Utah 1983).
Even if some of the issues present in the adjudication of the SBA's
claim are identical to those found in the present litigation, the
absence of the real party in interest in this litigation means that
those issues were not competently, fully and fairly litigated.
Therefore, collateral estoppel could not be imposed to eliminate
the Appellant's right to adjudicate the various issuers against the
real party in interest.
Any other application of collateral
estoppel would completely undermine the rules of mandatory joinder
and real party in interest.
ACS/ms
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have against the true holder of
Appellant has

"

- -

iction.

been afforded that opportun

case

Miit

1. tJei y t hr Appellant that

opportunity because <•* ^ alleged post-judgment assignment of the
real part}

- interest s •: - *>•

Such a res-.

•••

*.

- *. I c I i in • >l ;
)r more basic

requirements of aae process.

FOURTH ARGUMENT
THE SBA IS STILL THE REAL PARTY IN INTEREST

The dlleged assignment, which is a sham and fraud, hah nut
divested the SBA -

claim

-

outstanding obligate

ninety percent

(9U*)

'M""

iidered Respondent the real

2

Appellant's defenses against the claim of the SBA include the
fact that the Loan Restructure Agreement dated March 3, 1983,
altered the terms of the original loan agreement. One aspect of
that restructuring was that the Appellant and the Seftel's would
enter into new guaranty agreements under the terms of which they
would guaranty the total amount of the obligation to Respondent.
Therefore, pursuant to the terms of the Loan Restructure Agreement#
the original guaranty agreements, which included both Respondent
and the SBA, would be superseded by new guaranties running only to
the Respondent.
Whether the original guaranty agreements have been replaced
or superseded pursuant to the Loan Restructure Agreement
constitutes a question of fact that was never addressed by the
trial court or the Court of Appeals. If Appellant is allowed to
litigate the claim of the SBA under the original guaranty
agreements that factual claim will be presented and considered by
the district court and, finally, Appellant will be allowed his
opportunity to litigate the substantive issues involved in this
case against the real party i n i nterest to wi tf the SBA.
A C S / ins

I4

party

in

interest

as

to

the

SBA's

ninety

percent

(90%)

participation interest.3

As this Court explained in Stromquist v. Cokavne, 646 P.2d
746, 747 (Utah 1982), the right to commence and continue a legal
proceeding depends on the Plaintiff suffering an injury to a
legally protected right for which the law provides a remedy.

The

only legally protected right which the Respondent has is the right
to repayment of ten percent (10%) of the outstanding obligation.
That is the amount of money which it loaned to the original obligor
and that is the amount of money which it will lose if neither that
debtor nor a guarantor satisfies the obligation.

If a claim has been assigned in full, the assignee is the real
party in interest with the right to maintain the action on that
claim. See E.C.L. v. Denver Dept of Social Services, 742 P.2d 955,
956 (Colo. App. 1987).
However,

Lvnch v. MacDonald, 367 P.2d at 468.

if the assignment

fails to transfer

titled

to the

assignor's rights, the assignment is not valid and the assignee is
not the real party in interest.

See Farrell Const. Co. v.

Jefferson Parish, 693 F.Supp. 490, 497 (E.D. La. 1988).

As the

Court explained in Farrell:
A plaintiff can recover only by proving that he himself is
entitled to prevail on the cause of action alleged. It is not
enough that he prove that some other persons, not a party to
3

In its fifth argument Respondent admits that the SBA is
entitled to receive ninety percent (90%) of everything that it
recovers from Appellant notwithstanding the alleged assignment.
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the case, would h*-:- entitled
acti on. Ir* •••' < •

•

\\ n

i ^i M\M- ry i

cause

ft

f

Respondent admits ii i its present statements of facts thri* ' "*
SBA

- ™ ".

obligee under the

bas.

.

>e J 1 ai it s alleged liability.
10%)

percent
Throughout
•IMUISI

participant

these

tr-

proceed!

between

everything it collec*

Therefore, Respondent
the collects

xn
^^^-^=>
agreement

pay ninety
judgment to

<

u£

the SBA.4

is still acting
IUII

me

ninety

In fact, pursuant to •

those parties, Respondent must

forms

IIJUTI

The SBA

obligation

-

iobi1 i agent 01 the SBA.

•

wliu.'h LS due and owing *

n
the SBA.5

4

0n February 23, 1989, in direct contradiction to Respondent's
prior arguments and the alleged assignment, counsel for the SBA
explained to the district court the relationship between the SBA
and Respondent.
At the hearing, the SBA's counsel stated that
under an agreement between the parties Respondent must deliver to
the SBA its ninety percent (90%) share of all monies collected
under the judgment. (A certified copy of the transcript of that
hearing was attached as Exhibit "AM to Appellants Response to
Respondents Mootness Motion.)
5

Because Respondent is a named obligee on the guaranty in
question in this case, it has a claim against Appellant for
repayment of monies it loaned to the original debtor. Respondent
loaned ten percent (10%) of that total amount. Therefore, under
accepted principals of law it can show a contract right to
repayment of monies which it has lost and thus a legal claim for
repayment of its ten percent (10%) share. That is the extent of
its injury and the extent of its claim. By means of a trust deed
that claim is secured by real property.
The SBA on the other hand, has a claim under the same contract
of guaranty for repayment of ninety percent (90%) of the
outstanding obligation
That claim, is unsecured.
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The SBA remains the party which will receive the vast majority of
the benefit of Respondent's present judgment and therefore remains
the real party in interest
FIFTH ARGUMENT
THE DISTRICT COURT AND COURT OF APPEALS
ABUSED THEIR DISCRETION IN FAILING TO JOIN THE SBA
In its second argument, Respondent contends the issue of the
joinder of the SBA should be reviewed under an abuse of discretion
standard.

Appellant has argued that under the provisions of Rule

19(a), joinder of a necessary party is mandatory rather than
discretionary and therefore the lower court's failure to join a
necessary party which could have been joined is not a discretionary
act. Respondent does not contest the fact that the SBA could have
been joined in the present action.

Therefore, if the SBA is a

necessary party, it must be joined in the present proceedings.

Notwithstanding the mandatory joinder requirements of Rule
19(a), Respondent argues that the district court and the Utah Court
of Appeals did not abuse their discretion in denying the request
for joinder of the SBA.

The Court of Appeals found that the district court did not
follow the analytical steps required by Rule 19 and therefore
committed error. The Court of Appeals concluded that the district
court had committed error by failing to consider the relevant

ACS/ms
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idi.'tors ant

in i:i!

indispensable

in Unlv

party.

III mi deciding that the SBA wr*.s nut aJJ
This

error

constitutes

an

abuse

of

discretion. 6

In

affirming

the

district

cour

decision,

Appeals committed the same
,:
* .«• analysis

required

:

h.. *

ommitted.
c

Rather than undertaking
^

*

*

concluded that
Respondent

Court

error that
. %^

ir-t- rni

the

Appeals

merely

had authorized

*o

guaranty,

justified

the

conclusion that the SBA was ;*ww a** indispensable part

The Appellate

Court's

analytical error

is contained

in the

following statement:

"If, after the appropriate analysis, a party is deemed
necessary, ' a Court must then proceed to subsection (b), and
M
determine whether the party i s i ndispensable ,
Seftel, 767
P.2d at 945.
v

The determination that a party

H

i« vei^'Sdry

M JPI subsection

owed by analysis of whether or not that
party can be joined.

6

:i necessary party can be joined,

Rule

It is generally recognized that an abuse of discretion can
occur in three principal ways:
(1) when a relevant factor that
should be given significant weight is not considered; (2) when an
irrelevant or improper factor is considered and given significant
weight; and (3) when all proper factors, and no improper ones, are
considered, but the court, in weighing these factors, commits a
clear error of judgment. See Kern v. TXO Productions. Corp., 738
F.2d 968, 970 (8th Cir. 1984).
ACS/ms

19(a) makes the joinder mandatory.

If and only if the necessary

party can not be joined must the court proceed to subsection (b),
and determine whether the party is indispensable.

In the present case, federal statutory provisions provide that
the SBA may be made a
Section 634 (b)(1).

party in a state court action.

15 U.S.C.

Therefore under Rule 19(a) if the SBA is a

necessary party it must be joined.

Both the district court and the Appellate Court's failure to
properly analyze this issue of law and their failure to consider
relevant factors associated with that analysis constitutes an abuse
of discretion and reversible error.
SIXTH ARGUMENT
THE SBA IS A NECESSARY PARTY TO THE
PRESENT LITIGATION
In Respondent's third argument, it contents that the Court of
Appeals intended to say that the SBA was not a necessary party when
it stated that the SBA was not an indispensable party.

This is a

ridiculous claim.

The Court of Appeals clearly outlined the two step analysis
required by Rule 19 and recognized that "if, after the appropriate
analysis, a party is deemed "necessary", a court must then proceed
to

subsection

ACS/ms
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and
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whether

the

party

is

indispensable.

.

Seftel v. Capital City,

(Utah App. 1989).
used

the

term

76 7 P.2d

This JftIhf only i UM- t hdl the C o n n

"necessary"

.in the

text

of

941, 943
-: Appeals

its opinion, and this

reference provided the analytical starting point for its discussion
of the requirements of Ruh- H f lv, „
that

the

Court

of

Appeals

How thei I can Respondent argue

used

the

terms

necessary

and

indispensable interchangeable in the opinion?

Notwithstanding Respondent's mischaracterization ; t the Court
of Appeal's opinion, the real issue presented by tt*
third,

fourth

and

necessary party,

fifth
That

arguments

is

whether

the

SBA

;. ^ r.

issue was never addressed by the district

:: Court ** appeals and no findings mf fart were mevh1 in f hf

court
lower

-• '

-e i.o thai

issue.

Therefore, that issue is not

proper before this Court.

i ^ arguments, Respondent presents
case for why the SBA

Respondent's
is

founded

promissory

on
note

its

ri necessary party in this litigation.

argument that the SBA is not a necessary party

the

fact

which

that

was

Respondent

ori gi rial 1 y

debtor, Bagel Nosh Intermountain, Ltd. 7
7

is

the

I ssued

by

holder
the

of

the

principal

Respondent argues that as

Before the Court of Appeals, Respondent contended, although
it presented no admissible evidence in support thereof, that the
SBA had no legal interest in the guaranties, was not a party to the
note and had not funded any portion of the ] oan
Seftel v. Capital
City, 767 P.2d at 946.
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the holder and sole payee under the note it may enforce payment and
discharge the note in its own name. Respondent argues further that
the general rules regarding real party in interest do not apply in
the context of negotiable instruments.

Respondent's general statements of law are correct.

The

holder of a negotiable instrument, rather than its owner, may
enforce that instrument and as the holder of the Bagel Nosh note,
Respondent is entitled to enforce payment and discharge the note
in its own name.

However, Appellant is not a maker or endorser of the Bagel
Nosh note and has no liability to Respondent or anyone else under
that

note.

Rather, Appellant's

potential

liability to both

Respondent and the SBA results from his execution of a separate
guaranty

agreement.

And, while

a question of

fact

remains

concerning the enforceability of the original gueiranty agreement
(following execution of the Loan Modification Agreement), that
agreement was relied upon by the district court as the basis for
Appellant's liability to Respondent.

The

original

guaranty

agreement

is

not

a

negotiable

In its Brief, Respondent abandons these factual claims and
admits that the SBA had an interest in the guaranties which it
assigned to Respondent. Respondent also admits that the SBA is a
ninety percent (90%) participant in the note. Thus, the SBA has
in fact, funded ninety percent (90%) of the obligation.
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Sec,? United States v. Hunter, Sb2 F.Supp- 774, 778 (D.

instrument

Kan. 1986); United States Etc. v. Kurtz. 525 F.Supp 734, 743 (E.D.
Perm. 1981).

Therefore, the rules -i

• vu Section 70A-3-

**w i-.

i J -V-J ,i a negotiable instrument
are inapplicable to the collection of the obligation evidenced by
this guaranty agreement.

Respondent argues that, as holder of the note, it is the only
party entitled to enforce the note ami the SliA ib not entitled to
collect fui.

or assert claims under the note.

in relation

:

enforcement

of

concluded

the Bagel Nosh note but it has no relevance to

I hat

the
an

guaranty

the

agreement

obligee's

unconditional guaranty
enforce

This may be true

related

action

Federal
to

enforce

courts
an

have

absolute,

payment is distinct from any action to
r

-oiy

note

See

McAllister. 661 P-Supp. 1175. ! 177 (E,D. N.Y

United

States

v.

1987).

As the Court exp la i necl in .McAllister:
"This suit (to enforce an identical SBA guaranty) seeks
recovery under the guaranty executed by the Defendants as
individuals, not on the note executed by the corporate entity
Peconic Bay.
Nothing in defendant's agreement conditions
their liability on negotiation of the note. Id, 661 F.Supp.
at 11 77
Similarly/ in Strevell-Paterson Co., v. Francis, 646 P.2d 741,
744 (Utah 1982) r this court held that a
unconditional
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, v

v

.-. under an

: u*<- obligation of the

original debtor.

Therefore, the Respondent's conclusion that the SBA may not
assert claims against Appellant through enforcement of the guaranty
is contrary to accepted legal principals.

As a named obligee on

the guaranty agreement, the SBA has a cause of action against
Appellant

for enforcement

of

its portion of the obligation.

Because the SBA is a ninety percent (90%) participant and joint
obligee under the terms of the guaranty agreement it is a necessary
party to the enforcement of that agreement.

CONCLUSION

The SBA has a contract claim against Appellant.

That claim

is based on an agreement between the SBA, Respondent and Appellant
which is memorialized in an SBA Form 148 guaranty agreement. Under
the terms of that guaranty agreement, Appellant promised to pay to
the SBA and Respondent, as joint obligees, a sum of money. The SBA
Form 148 guaranty is not a negotiable instrument.

Rather it is a

simple contract the enforcement of which is governed by general
contract law.

Enforcement of the contract obligation between the SBA and
Appellant is separate and distinct from any enforcement of the
promissory note issued to Respondent by Bagel Nosh Intermountain,
Ltd.
ACS/ms
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Respondent ami Appellant is separate and distinct from Respondent r s
enforcement of the Bagel Nosh promissory note.

The separate nature

of the joint obligee's claims against Appe]JciriI. nuclei t h^ SBA Fi>ni»
] 48 g uaranty agreement has been defined by prior rulings of the
Federal Courts.

Respondent asks this Court to ignore these legal precedents
and

the

simple

rules

-~ which

should

gover

determination.

*^:s

^

Court's

Respondent

argues that enforcement of the SBA Form 148 guaranty agreement can
not

be

note.

separated

from enforcement

Respondent

re a H < * 11 is t. hat

promissory note, it, and
contract

obligation

agreement.

n

evidenced

by

upon throughout these proceedings

it.s

Udcjel Nosh

t »ec a i j s c • it

the

*•:

that

I he

promissory

11 •» t hut* holder o f that

alone, can pursue enforcement of the

Thi

Realizing

ot

SBA
me

Form

148

guaranty

Respondent has relied

is 5imply wrong.

fundamental

premise

may

be

unfounded,

Respondent has attempted to side step the issues presented in this
Appeal by allegedly obtaining an assignment <.f the SBA." b .contract
claim.
that

Based

on

the present

t.hitj alleged
appeal

assignment,

is moot

The assignment

claim, even if it has been made, does
c.

Respondent now claims
of

the

SBA's

haiuje the nature of that

appeal.

Appellant
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to present
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his defenses to the

SBA's claim. Whether the SBA, Respondent or some other third party
holds that claim is immaterial to Appellant's exercise of that
legal right.

Because the SBA was not a party to the lower court

proceedings, Appellant has not been given an opportunity to defend
directly against that claim. The alleged, post-judgment assignment
can not eliminate Appellant's right to fully and fairly adjudicate
that claim.

Therefore, the SBA's post-judgment assignment of its claim is
immaterial to the present Appeal. That assignment does not end the
controversy between the parties and it does not render reversal of
Respondent's judgment a meaningless act.

This Appeal is not moot

and this Court should rule on the substantive issues presented
herein and reverse the lower court's judgment.

Dated this 7th day of November, 1989.
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